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Abstract. Stablecoins promise to bridge fiat currencies with the world
of cryptocurrencies. They provide a way for users to take advantage of
the benefits of digital currencies, such as ability to transfer assets over the
internet, provide assurance on minting schedules and scarcity, and enable
new asset classes, while also partially mitigating their volatility risks. In
this paper, we systematically discuss general design, decompose exist-
ing stablecoins into various component design elements, explore their
strengths and drawbacks, and identify future directions.
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1 Introduction
Cryptoasset prices are famous for their volatility. Though many cryptoassets
aspire to become world currencies, most are frequently dismissed as no more
than speculative assets due to their wild price swings.
Money is supposed to have three functions: a store of value, a unit of account,
and a medium of exchange. Stability is key to all these functions. Store of value is
the most salient; if people store their wealth in an asset that constantly fluctuates
in value, their wealth will fluctuate accordingly. A volatile asset is also a poor unit
of account, because it is inconvenient to denominate prices in something which
constantly changes in value. Every time the value of the unit of account changes,
all prices must be adjusted accordingly. Finally, and most crucially, a currency
needs to be stable to function as a medium of exchange; this allows people to be
be fairly and predictably compensated for goods and services without changes
in value during the payment process.
Stablecoins are a class of cryptoassets created to address this problem. As the
name implies, they are designed to be price stable with respect to some reference
point. There has recently been an explosion in the number of stablecoin projects
announced, especially following the crash in Bitcoin prices in early 2018. There
are over a hundred stablecoins in existence or in progress, with the top three
projects now representing a market capitalization of $4.6B [22]. Although the
sheer number of projects seems overwhelming, they can all be decomposed into
a few key features.
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Roadmap. We briefly review related works in Section 2. In Section 3, we break
down the taxonomy of stablecoins based on the first three constituent axes: the
peg type, the collateral type, and the collateral amount. In Section 4, we expand
on additional axes by discussing the mechanism of action chosen by various
stablecoin families. In Section 5 we discuss methods to measure prices. In Section
6, we discuss some design features relevant to digital currencies in general, but
especially important for stablecoins. Finally, we discuss future directions for
stablecoins in Section 7.
2 Related Work
One of the first stablecoin taxonomies classified stablecoin projects by collat-
eral type and discussed pros and cons of each category [56]. Several papers
and reports have followed a similar taxonomy, adding more detail on individ-
ual projects [57] [58] [48]. A paper by Pernice et. al takes a different approach,
categorizing stablecoins by monetary and exchange rate regimes [54]. Our contri-
bution is extending the existing taxonomies with a discussion of other important
stablecoin design aspects, namely price stabilizing mechanisms and price mea-
surement methods. We also categorize many of the existing stablecoin projects
according to our extended taxonomy.
3 Peg and Collateral
3.1 Peg
The most salient choice for stablecoin design is the peg, which oftentimes is
included in the name of the stablecoin.1 USD is a popular choice, likely due
to USD being typically considered a stable store of value around the world. In
fact, it is not uncommon for foreign citizens, especially those in emerging and
developing economies, to store their wealth in USD rather than their national
currency. The other benefit of using USD is that price comparison is easy. A
singular fiat currency peg allows one to check whether the peg holds by simply
comparing the dollar price of an object to the pegged coin price of the same
object. Other stable fiat currencies, such as the Euro, the Japanese Yen, and the
Swiss Franc, are also popular choices for similar reasons.
Besides fiat, there are also stablecoins pegged to commodities, most com-
monly gold. Some examples include Digix [27] and HelloGold [31]. It is inter-
esting to note that, in general, there are fewer commodity-pegged coins than
fiat-pegged coins. A possible explanation is that commodity prices fluctuate in
value more than fiat currencies, although typically less severely than most digital
currencies.
Other stablecoins may choose to peg to a bundle of currencies and/or com-
modities. This has the benefit of insulating the stablecoin against shocks to any
1 Examples include TrueUSD [69], USDC [20], USDX [55], USDVault [71], A-Eurs [61],
and many others.
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Fig. 1. Stablecoin taxonomy, decomposed into four main axes: peg, collateral, mecha-
nism, and price information.
one country, currency, or commodity. However, pegging to a bundle can also
have the opposite effect and introduce noise if some of the assets included in the
bundle are very volatile. Saga [60], for example, is pegged to the IMF’s special
drawing rights (SDR), a basket of world currencies curated by the IMF. Cur-
rencies are selected into the SDR if the issuing country is one of the world’s top
exporters, the currency is widely used in international transactions, and the cur-
rency is widely traded in foreign exchange markets. However, the SDR is seldom
used in any context other than the IMF’s store of value and unit of account,
making it a less practical choice than the dollar. Facebook’s upcoming Libra
also plans to peg its currency to an as of yet undetermined basket of currencies
and assets.
Saga plans to later peg their currency to the consumer price index (CPI)
if they outgrow the SDR, i.e. if they become a dominant world currency. The
CPI is a unitless index which tracks the inflation of the price of a basket of
consumer goods. No stablecoin is currently pegged to the CPI, so it is unclear
how this would be executed. It is possible, for example, that the stablecoin supply
would be adjusted so the nominal price level remains constant. Pegging to a
fiat currency or commodity with finite supply can eventually lead to problems
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of scale, and pegging to an index can circumvent this problem.2 However, the
choice of CPI as a peg is not ideal for a variety of reasons. It is typically measured
monthly or even less frequently, due to logistical challenges in determining what
should be in the basket and how much each component should be weighted. There
are also regional differences in consumption, so it is unclear how to construct a
basket that reflects global spending patterns.
3.2 Collateral
Emergent currencies often make use of collateral to ensure that the circulating
currency has redemption value. This provides a lower bound on the price, thereby
mitigating some of the risk of holding, using, and denominating debts in the
currency. Since the goal of collateralizing is to bound the redemption value, it is
easiest and most effective, but not necessary,3 to use whatever the stablecoin is
pegged to. If users can always redeem one unit of the stablecoin for one dollar,
arbitrageurs should ensure that it never trades at any other price.
Unfortunately, collateralizing a coin creates the problem of securely storing
large quantities of the collateral.Traditionally, the best place to store large quan-
tities of cash is in a bank, because it is secure, relatively easy to audit, and often
comes with deposit insurance. However, this is also centralized, thus making it
prone to deceptive practices. For example, Tether [66] recently admitted it was
only 74% collateralized [65], despite initially claiming full collateralization [66].
Moreover, there are often limits to how much deposit insurance covers, poten-
tially leaving the majority of the reserve uninsured. Some stablecoins avoid this
problem by storing their collateral as physical cash in a vault instead of a bank.
For example, Rockz [59] stores 90% of its collateral in the form of physical fiat
currency in an underground vault in the Swiss Alps.
Commodity backed stablecoins also suffer from the problem of where to store
their collateral, since there are fewer institutions which accept and insure de-
posits in the form of commodities than ones that accept cash. This, in turn,
leads to a high degree of centralization.
One way to avoid having to store large amounts of fiat is to collateralize
with another cryptocurrency. This has the advantage of potentially decentralized
operation, and allows for easier diversification across backing assets. The problem
with this approach is that digital collateral can itself be very volatile, making it
hard to use as a guarantee of value. Any stablecoin backed by cryptocurrencies
must have some mechanism built in to safely handle large swings in the value of
the underlying collateral. We discuss these mechanisms in section 4.
Other stablecoins do away with the problem of volatile collateral by simply
not collateralizing the currency at all. This has many advantages. First, not
having any collateral to store or unlock simplifies many logistical challenges.
Second, it is also cheap to operate, since it does not require the issuer to keep
real or crypto assets on hand. Unfortunately, this ease of operation comes with
2 This is one of the reasons the US went off of the gold standard.
3 USDVault for example is pegged to USD but collateralized with gold.
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Fig. 2. NuBits price collapse
drawbacks. Algorithms are usually gameable. The value of the currency in this
case stems purely from the reliability of the issuing mechanism and/or people’s
beliefs. Once users’ expectations of the coin’s stability change, whether due to a
flaw in design or idiosyncratic changes in sentiment, there may be little to keep
the price afloat because there is no inherent redemption value. Consequently,
when these stablecoins fail, they tend to do so swiftly and catastrophically. One
example is NuBits [45], which dropped from its pegged price of $1 to less than
$0.30 over the course of 2 weeks in early 2018. It never recovered its peg, and
has been trading below $0.10 for the past six months.4
3.3 Collateral amount
Hand in hand with the decision of collateral type comes the decision of collat-
eral amount. Since collateral serves to support the price by creating a reliable
redemption value, the best choice seems to be a fully collateralized stablecoin.
If every unit of currency can be redeemed for the underlying asset, there is vir-
tually no rational reason they should ever trade at different prices, thus making
price fluctuations minimal. However, one to one collateralization is sometimes
excessive, and sometimes insufficient.
Having a full reserve, where the value of the collateral is exactly the value of
the circulating currency, makes it hard for a currency to scale. As the stablecoin
4 Note that USD is not collateralized, and yet it remains stable. However, when the
dollar was a fledgling currency it was backed by gold. It was only after extensive
global adoption that the backing was gradually eased-off. Additionally, the US gov-
ernment has the infrastructure to support this type of regime. US federal law makes
it so that businesses are required to accept US issued currency as legal tender. There
are also regulatory and executive agencies that enforce compliance.
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becomes more widely used, the issuers have to keep buying more collateral in
order to keep up with demand. Nevertheless, this stablecoin design has been
successfully utilized by Hong Kong’s currency board; the Hong Kong Dollar is
fully collateralized by USD and has maintained a roughly 7.8 to 1 peg to the US
dollar since the early 1980s. It is currently the 13th most traded currency in the
world [36].
Instead of staying fully collateralized, some currencies, like Saga, try to mimic
the historical trajectory taken by the US Dollar. Such currencies initially fully
collateralize their stablecoin, then slowly reduce their collateral ratio and ease off
the peg once the money supply has exceeded some threshold. Although Tether
eventually admitted they were not fully collateralized as they initially claimed,
there was no ostensible detriment to the price. A reason for the continued sta-
bility despite only partial collateralization is that full collateral is not necessary
as long as people do not believe that more than the entire reserve amount will
ever be cashed out at once. It is also worth noting that almost any supposedly
fully collateralized fiat backed stablecoin whose collateral is being held in a bank,
such as USDC, is functionally a partial reserve currency. All commercial banks
keep only some of their deposits on hand and use the rest for investments or to
issue loans. This does not cause any problems as long as they keep enough on
hand to satisfy demand for withdrawals.
Other coins, especially algorithmic ones such as Basis [2], do not keep any
collateral at all. Instead, value is preserved purely by expanding supply when
the price is too high and contracting it when the price is too low. On the other
end of the spectrum, many currencies collateralized by crypto-currencies keep
more than the value of the circulating currency in reserve to guard against price
swings in the collateral. This way, even if the collateral asset depreciates, there
is still enough for each unit of the stablecoin to be redeemed for an equivalent
amount of the underlying asset.
4 Mechanics
All stablecoins require some mechanism to adjust the price when it deviates
from the peg. Usually, this is done by expanding supply when the price is too
high and contracting it when the price is too low. This means that there usually
needs to be some way of measuring the price (covered further in the next section)
and knowing how much to expand or contract the supply. Most stablecoins are
designed such that rational, self interested users will act to restore the peg when
the price deviates. For example, this could be achieved by allowing users to
redeem stablecoins for collateral when the price of the stablecoin is too low.
Other stablecoins issue a secondary token designed to absorb the volatility of
the first, resulting in a stablecoin/volatilecoin pair. Still others depend on an
algorithmic market making mechanism or central-bank contract to manage the
supply.
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Reserve of Pegged Asset Many stablecoins will build a mechanism where
users will be incentivized to expand or contract the supply until the price re-
turns to the peg. The simplest way to achieve this is in a fully collateralized
system backed by the pegged asset, and allow users to expand supply when
the price is too high and redeem when the price is too low. Arbitrageurs earn
money while helping maintain the peg. For example, if a stablecoin pegged to
USD is trading at less than $1, stablecoin holders should redeem the coin for
the underlying collateral, thereby buying a dollar for less than a dollar. This
will contract the supply until the price returns to the peg and the arbitrage
opportunity disappears, or until the reserve runs out.
On the other hand, if the market price of the stablecoin is above $1, many sys-
tems will allow users to expand the supply by wiring funds to the account where
the rest of the collateral is being held. This allows the user to buy something
worth more than $1 by paying only $1 for it. The simplicity and autonomy of
this system makes it extremely appealing, which is why a majority of stablecoins
in circulation today use this method, or a very similar one. However, it is not
foolproof. On October 15, 2018, the price of Tether briefly dropped below $0.93
due to a large selloff. The price recovered to above $0.98 within the day and
appears to have suffered no lasting effects [22]. Other notable examples of this
design include USDC, TrueUSD, Carbon [18], Paxos [19], Gemini Dollars [23],
and many others.
As stated previously, the main problem with allowing users to always redeem
for collateral is storing large amounts of collateral at some physical location.
Since it is expensive to provide the security needed to protect large sums of
money, most stablecoins rely on one central location, like a bank. This introduces
two issues: centralization and dependency on legacy financial institutions. USDC
gets around one of these problems by storing collateral at a network of banks
rather than a single one. However, it still relies heavily on existing banks. The
other problem with this type of system is the ability to scale. As previously
discussed, this makes it difficult, though not impossible, to become a global
currency due to the inconvenience of storing assets of such high value in a large
number of locations. This inconvenience, is one of the reasons USD outgrew the
gold standard.
A common variation on this design requires a central authority to mint the
coins, but allows people to redeem the stablecoin for the underlying collateral.
This creates a lower bound on the price of the stablecoin but not an upper
bound, since users can redeem when the stablecoin price is too low but cannot
mint when the price is too high. This is common in cases where the collateral is
not necessarily dollars, such as Digix. Since it would be inconvenient to accept
and verify gold deposits from individual users, users are not allowed to mint
Digix by contributing capital to the collateral pool. They can, however, still
redeem their Digix for physical gold, thereby creating a lower bound on the
value of Digix.
In addition to allowing people to mint coins, Tether was released in waves,
allegedly at strategic times to prop up the price of Bitcoin [34]. Users can redeem
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Tether for USD, but since Tether is no longer fully collateralized, they also
reserve the right to deny people the right to redeem.
Another variation being employed by Facebook’s Libra [46] is to allow only
the set of validators to mint or redeem coins, instead of all users. This reduces
overhead since presumably larger amounts would be transacted each time, and
at a lower frequency. This may come at the cost of a lower speed of adjustment,
since the set of potential arbitrageurs who can correct the price is restricted.
Dual coin Another way to maintain stability is to pair the pegged coin with
a secondary coin which absorbs the volatility of the first. The most well known
example of this is the seigniorage shares model employed by the original formula-
tion of Carbon. When the price of the stablecoin dips below the peg, a secondary
coin is auctioned in exchange for the stablecoin. The proceeds from the auction
are then burned to contract the supply. When the price of the stablecoin is above
the peg, additional coins are minted to holders of the secondary token. Holders
of the secondary token help prop up the price when the currency inflates and
are rewarded during deflationary periods.
There are two big concerns with this type of system. One is that the secondary
coin often meets the SEC’s definition of a security. Regulatory complications
stemming from this designation were enough to keep Basis from launching [1].
Carbon also changed from a dual coin system to a fiat backed system, for undis-
closed reasons, possibly due to regulatory hurdles. The second concern is that if
holders of the primary token do not believe that the stablecoin will appreciate
in the future, there is no incentive to buy or hold the secondary token. In other
words, one needs a strong contingent of users who, even during a downturn, be-
lieve that the stablecoin will eventually appreciate in value. Additionally, since
cryptocurrency markets are often subject to long downturns, people may be re-
luctant to wait for extended, indeterminate amounts of time for their investment
to pay off. Since there is no collateral backing this system, if people are not will-
ing to buy the secondary coin, there will be no force propping up the value of
the stablecoin.
Variations on this design include USDX and Celo [39], which use concepts
from dual coin systems and redemption based systems to peg their tokens. USDX
is a stablecoin collateralized with Lighthouse (LHT), a digital currency. USDX is
pegged to USD but backed over 200% by LHT, which is stored in two centralized
funds. People are free to exchange LHT to USDX and vice versa at a valuation
of $1/USDX. As such, when USDX is trading at a price of less than $1, people
are incentivized to redeem it for $1 worth of LHT, contracting the supply and
raising the price. LHT ends up absorbing the volatility of USDX because the
supply of USDX is contracted by expanding the circulating supply of LHT. The
main issue in this design stems from USDX being 200% collateralized by LHT.
The largest possible market cap for USDX is half the market cap of LHT, and
if the market value of LHT declines, so does the potential market cap of USDX.
It is unclear what LHT derives its value from, so the potential market cap of
USDX might be small and/or unstable.
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Celo works similarly to USDX, but with a few additions. Celo is backed by
CeloGold,5 Bitcoin, and Ethereum. In addition to allowing people to redeem
Celo for CeloGold and vice versa, there is an algorithmic central bank which
buys and sells Celo and CeloGold to stabilize the price.
StatiCoin/RiskCoin [62] is another variation of the dual coin system which
allows creation and redemption of coins to maintain a peg. Users who want
to mint StatiCoin send ETH to the contract and receive a dollar equivalent
amount of StatiCoin in return. When they want to redeem, they send StatiCoin
to the contract and receive an equivalent dollar amount of ETH. Users who want
to mint RiskCoin also send ETH to the contract and receive a corresponding
amount of RiskCoin in return, depending on what the current RiskCoin price
is. StatiCoin can always be redeemed for $1 worth of ETH, provided there is
enough collateral, while RiskCoin holders are the residual claimant to the ETH
held by the contract. If there is $100 worth of ETH held by the contract, 90
StatiCoins in circulation, and 2 RiskCoins in circulation, the value of all of the
outstanding Riskcoin is $10 and each RiskCoin is worth $5. If the next day the
value of the ETH held in the contract drops to $90, RiskCoin will be worth
$0 and users will not be allowed to mint additional RiskCoin until the dollar
value of collateral exceeds the number of StatiCoin issued. StatiCoin is unique
because it is crypto-collateralized but does not require overcollateralization, an
inefficient mechanism for absorbing volatility. If the value of the collateral falls
below the market cap of StatiCoin, StatiCoin may become unpegged because
not all holders of StatiCoin will be able to redeem for the underlying collateral.
If the price of ETH drops enough to reduce the price of RiskCoin to 0, then
StatiCoin will become an unreliable store of value precisely when Ethereum is
losing value and a stable valued asset is most needed.
Terra [40] is yet another dual coin stablecoin, with its volatility absorbed by
the secondary token Luna. Luna serves two purposes in this system. It absorbs
volatility because it is auctioned to contract the supply when the stablecoin
price is too low and purchased with Terra when the stablecoin price is too high.
It is also the staking token of the system. Fees and mining rewards, paid in
Terra, are increased when Terra decreases in value to incentivize holding Luna
and smooth the pro-cyclicality of the value of Luna. Unlike previously discussed
designs, such as Staticoin/Riskcoin, the secondary token Luna can retain value
and creates payoffs from fees and mining rewards even in an extended contrac-
tion. However, it does this by raising fees when the value of Terra is decreasing,
which discourages Terra use when the value of Terra is already low. Terra also
increases the staking pool in times when the market cap of Terra is small and
there is less need for stakers, and decreases it when the market cap is large and
more security is needed.
Yet another variation on the dual coin system is the triple coin system pro-
posed by Basis. Instead of having a singular volatility absorbing coin, Basis has
bond tokens and share tokens. Bond tokens are auctioned off when the price of
Basis decreases below $1, and each one is redeemable for 1 Basis when the price
5 Despite its name, CeloGold not actually backed by gold or any other asset
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of Basis is above $1. If all of the Bond tokens have been redeemed and the price
of Basis is still above $1, additional Basis is minted pro rata to holders of share
tokens until the price of Basis returns to $1. Holders of Basis bonds absorb the
downside and are the first to benefit from increases in the market cap of Basis,
while holders of Basis shares benefit only when there are large expansions in the
value of Basis. There are infinite ways to tranche the volatility absorbing coin;
in theory there could be systems with four or more coins splitting the stablecoin
volatility across several parties.
Algorithmic Other currencies use a fully algorithmic approach to adjust the
supply of the stablecoin in response to price fluctuations. One such example
is Ampleforth, previously named Fragments [42]. Whenever the value of Am-
pleforth changes, token holders have their balances adjusted proportionally to
preserve the value of a single token. For example, if Ampleforth is originally
worth $1, then, after an increase of 10% to $1.10, all balances will automatically
be inflated by 10%. Likewise, if the value of Ampleforth declines, each Ample-
forth holder’s balance will be decreased accordingly. This makes Ampleforth a
stable unit of account, since by design, the ratio of Ampleforth’s market cap
to the number of Ampleforth tokens is periodically adjusted to be $1. Unfor-
tunately, this is not a good store of value. Holding Ampleforth is no different
than holding a non-pegged coin: if the market cap of Ampleforth declines, users’
balances and outstanding payments will decline proportionally.
A different algorithmic approach is employed by Saga. Although Saga does
not peg the value of its coin, it uses an algorithmic path-independent market
maker inspired by Bancor [35] to provide liquidity and to dampen sudden price
fluctuations. The market maker sets the price and bid ask spread for Saga based
on how much collateral it has in its reserve. For example, when Saga is just
starting out and its reserve is small, the price will be set at 1 SDR, and the
market maker will sell a Saga for 1.0015 SDR and buy for 0.9985 SDR. This
makes it so that users should not sell Saga on secondary markets for less than
0.9985 or buy for more than 1.0015 SDR, which limits how suddenly the price
can change. As the reserve grows and shrinks, the price and spread are gradually
adjusted in response. Like Ampleforth, Saga does not guarantee that the value
of Saga holdings will be stable over time. However, the market maker does guard
against sudden price movements, and thus provides short-term stability.
Leveraged loans Leveraged loans are a system of stablecoins which utilize
components from all the above classes. Dai [47] is the most successful example of
such a system. Users lock up collateral, such as Ethereum and other cryptoassets,
in collateralized debt positions (CDPs). They can then mint Dai, a stablecoin
pegged to $1, up to 2/3 the value of the collateral in the CDP. Users can then
unlock their collateral by paying back the borrowed Dai, plus a stability fee that
accrues over time. Dai is destroyed once it is paid back.
If the value of the collateral in a CDP drops below 1.5x the Dai borrowed, the
debt position is automatically liquidated, and the collateral is used to purchase
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the amount of Dai borrowed against it. Any remaining collateral, minus a liqui-
dation fee, is returned to the original CDP owner. If the value of the collateral
depreciates quickly and drops below the value of the Dai borrowed, a secondary
coin is minted to cover the difference. Currently, the secondary coin is PETH,
but eventually it will be transitioned to MKR. Since MKR is the governance
token, and MKR holders are diluted when CDPs are underwater, there is an
incentive for the holders of the governance token to set parameters such that
users are not defaulting on their loans. However, we note that the probability of
the value of the collateral declining to less than the Dai borrowed is low since
the price of the collateral would have to suddenly drop by over 33%.
Users are incentivized to buy Dai and unlock their collateral when the price
of Dai decreases, because a decrease in the price of Dai makes it cheaper for
them to unlock their collateral. This contracts the supply and restores the peg.
If Dai continues to trade at a price lower than its intended peg, MKR holders
can vote to raise the stability fee charged to CDP holders. This serves as further
incentive for CDP holders to liquidate their positions and contract supply.
Dai received a lot of attention in March 2019 for consistently trading around
$0.98 instead of $1 as it was supposed to. Since then, it underwent a series
of stability fee increases, some of which quixotically lowered the price of Dai
instead of raising it as intended. Despite this issue and Ethereum’s price decrease
by ∼ 90% since Dai launched, Dai has managed to remain within ∼ 2% of its
pegged value.
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Fig. 3. DAI remains relatively price stable despite decline in ETH price.
Miscellaneous There are a few other designs that do not neatly fit into any of
the above categories. For example, Steem [63] props up the price of its stablecoin,
Steem Dollars, by paying interest on Steem Dollars. However, since they don’t
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set negative interest rates, this mechanism may not work if the price of Steem
is too high and the interest rate is already low. Consequently, Steem Dollars
traded for more than its $1 peg for months despite an interest rate of 0%.
Another design is employed by NuBits (now defunct), a stablecoin which is
minted when holders of a secondary coin (NuShares) vote to create more. Users
are also paid interest if they temporarily remove their NuBits from circulation.
This project is no longer in operation, possibly due to voting on supply changes
being a slow process, thus forcing adjustments in price to lag by several days
or more. Additionally, if holders of NuShares also hold NuBits, they may be
reluctant to dilute the value of NuBits by printing more.
Kowala [4] keeps the price stable by adjusting its mining rewards. When the
price of the stablecoin is too high, rewards increase to dilute the supply; when
the price of the stablecoin is too low, transaction fees are burned to contract the
supply. Unfortunately, a decline in the price of the stablecoin might be correlated
with fewer transactions occurring, since a break from the peg would diminish
users’ confidence in the stablecoin. Since price adjustments are effected through
mining and transactions, recovering from a decrease in price would take a long
time. Also, since mining rewards decrease during contractionary periods, miners
have less incentive to provide security which may further diminish the value of
Kowala. This could lead to a feedback loop where Kowala never recovers from a
price decrease.
Finally, Phi [30] offers people the opportunity to issue loans denominated in
Phi, a stablecoin. The loan issuer has to put up collateral, which is used to pay
the loan if the borrower defaults. Although the issuer does collect interest on the
loan, the issuer has have no way to recover their capital if the borrower defaults.
Moreover, because there is no connection to real world identities, there is no
ostensible consequence to defaulting, so borrowers will likely abscond with the
loan. If the borrower does pay back the loan, they are supposed to pay it with
interest denominated in Phi. Since, for every loan originated in Phi, the amount
paid exceeds the amount created, there could be not enough coins in existence
to pay back all existing loans with interest. Finally, although Phi serves as a
unit of account for the loans issued, it is not clear why the value should remain
stable, or why Phi might be used as a store of value or medium of exchange.
5 Price information
A crucial step in making supply adjustments at the appropriate times is accu-
rately measuring the price. Most stablecoins make use of an external oracle, an
independent price feed(s) deemed trustworthy by the issuers of the stablecoin.
This leaves a crucial component of the system completely out of the hands of
the stablecoin issuer. The entities publishing the price feed might deviate from
their standard practice in how they calculate prices and trigger disastrous down-
turns or upturns for the stablecoin. This is not unheard of, since, for example,
CoinMarketCap suddenly and abruptly decided to stop including prices from
exchanges in South Korea, resulting in a sudden drop in reported prices [21].
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If a stablecoin was formerly using this price feed and desired no change in how
prices are calculated, the system would be left with few options other than to
accept the new price feed, find a different oracle, or adjust oracle prices to cor-
rect for the new calculation method. Short term pricing errors can arise from
using an oracle too, as was the case with Synthetix. In June 2019, a commercial
API used by Synthetix suffered a glitch and began to report incorrect exchange
rates, resulting in a bot making over $1B during this period [9]. Although the
bot owner chose to reverse the trades during this episode, there is no guarantee
that the next profiteer will be as generous. Note that these are examples which
arose even with no malicious adversaries in the system.
On the other hand, if there is a malicious actor intent on sabotaging the
stability, a price oracle can serve as a potential target. Increasing the number
of price feeds might be a potential solution to this issue. However using the
median makes price updating slow, since the system must wait for sufficient
majority of price feed reports. As a result, even some of the most active and
popular stablecoins, including MakerDao, use only a few price oracles, making
them a potential source of attack vectors [49]. There are only 14 price oracles for
MakerDao, so hijacking of any 8 would corrupt the median-price rule. Moreover,
these oracles may not be fully independent, as they might have overlap in where
they obtain their price information or in their deployment platform.
Nonetheless, the use of external oracles persists because the alternatives are
generally worse. Prices for most assets are generated based on the prices at
which the assets are transacted on exchanges. However, many crypto exchanges,
both centralized and decentralized, have stale prices and/or inflation of trade
volumes [7]. If trades are being inflated by the exchange, it is possible that
exchanges might just be taking prices from some external feed and adding noise.
Unless the initial exchanges are chosen wisely and with near perfect foresight, a
non-noisy price feed is just as good or better.
Alternately, Schelling point mechanisms [16], a.k.a. crowd oracles, can also
be used to set the price. The justification for this method is that it is hard for
voters to coordinate on a deceptive answer. However, with a pegged coin, there
exists a natural alternate coordination point: the pegged price. If this is a more
advantageous equilibrium for voters, then information obtained in this manner
is not going to be trustworthy. Many of these schemes use rewards for being close
to the median and slashing for voters far from the median to incentivize truth
telling. However, this may incentivize people to answer how they think others
will answer, commonly known in economics as the beauty pageant problem.
Take for example Basis, a variant of the dual coin example discussed earlier,
whose original design mentioned the possibility of using a crowd oracle. If users
correctly express that the stablecoin has appreciated and is trading above its peg,
more of the stablecoin will be minted, and users who only hold the stablecoin
and not the secondary coin will be diluted. This makes it such that the payoff
for holders of the stablecoin is higher if they lie and claim that the stablecoin
is trading at its intended price rather than its true price. Even if a user wants
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to tell the truth, when enough people are incentivized to divert, the rest of the
honest users will have to lie, abstain from voting, or be penalized.
Terra tries to get around the problem of dishonest voting by sampling only
a subset of voters to make collusion difficult. However, if there is a non truthful
equilibrium that is beneficial for a majority of voters, then the subsampling may
not help. Celo also uses a crowd oracle and acknowledges that there is potential
for price manipulation. The designers of Celo trust that holders of the voting
token will prioritize long term growth over short term profit, which may be an
incorrect assumption.
Some stablecoins are designed so that no external oracle is needed for the
stablecoin to remain stable. In systems where users can always trade in for the
underlying collateral, such as Tether or Saga, there is no need for a price feed.
Instead, prices are measured using users’ trades. Individual users decide how
to value the token and then cash in or out accordingly. However, as previously
discussed, the convenience of not having to measure the price usually comes at
the cost of having to store collateral.
6 Other Considerations
Governance Flexible governance is the ability to change system parameters
and operation dynamically in response to changes in the environment, allowing
a coin to scale or overcome unforeseen obstacles. This is an emerging choice
for digital currencies, first popularized by Tezos. It has since been adopted by
others, including several stablecoins.
Although the idea of crowd-sourcing system parameters caters to a demo-
cratic ideal consistent with crypto’s ethos of decentralization, in actuality, par-
ticipation may be low. This may leave important decisions in the hands of a
motivated minority. For example, the March 7, 2019 stability fee increase in Dai
was approved with less than 1% of MKR holders voting and a single address
contributing more than 50% of the stake [50]. Besides low turnout, voting may
suffer from high latency. If specific governance changes require human participa-
tion, then the process becomes highly contentious and complicated. On the other
hand, if there is no way to amend the governance, the founding team must fore-
see every problem or potentially hard fork every time a change has to be made.
This can lead to systems which are inflexible and react poorly to changing global
environments.
Fees Fees can be used to incentivize good behavior, such as how Dai’s liquidation
fee penalizes low levels of collateral. The presence of this fee rewards MKR
holders who are supposed to police the CDPs and penalizes CDP owners who are
negligent with their balances. However, they can also introduce pricing frictions.
For example, if a fully collateralized fiat backed token has no fees, arbitrageurs
should guarantee that it never trades at anything but $1. However, fees (such as
those employed by TrueUSD) introduce a friction which prevents arbitrageurs
from taking advantage of and correcting price discrepancy. Suppose that a coin
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which is supposed to trade for $1 is instead trading for $0.99. If there is a cashing
out fee of $70 (as with TrueUSD), someone would have to buy $6930 worth of
TrueUSD and cash it in at $7000 just to break even. To make a profit, they would
have to invest even more money into this strategy. This is can be capital intensive
for the arbitrageur. Moreover, the cashing out process is not instantaneous since
wire transfers take time to process. This introduces an opportunity cost as this
strategy can tie up capital for a day or more each time it is used.
Regulatory Compliance Another aspect some coins are grappling with is
the degree of regulatory compliance. Although KYC/AML compliance avoids
the possibility of regulatory problems down the road, it also alienates some
potential users. Some people may demand absolute privacy, be concerned about
secure consumer data storage, or be unbanked because they lack the paperwork
necessary to go through the KYC process. Other regulatory costs, such as the
time, effort, and lawyers required to file with the relevant regulatory agencies,
make it prohibitively expensive to launch a coin, as was the case with Basis [1].
And finally, being KYC/AML compliant in one country does not protect the
issuer from liability if the coin is being used in another country.
It is especially crucial for coins that are fiat backed with collateral stored in
banks to not break any laws because banks can freeze accounts if they suspect
suspicious or illegal activity. For example, if the stablecoin is being abused for
money laundering or other similar purposes, depository banks can stop money
from being withdrawn or deposited in the account. This would prevent users
from creating or redeeming tokens and hinder quantity adjustments necessary
to keep the price stable. This is not a purely hypothetical problem. In April
2017, Tether found themselves unable to accept international wire transfers into
their Singapore bank accounts and were denied outgoing wire transfers by Wells
Fargo [72].
7 Future Directions
7.1 Stable Pay
One alternative to stabilizing an entire currency supply is to only stabilize pay-
ments. This can be a cheaper and easier than stabilizing the entire monetary
supply. The only currency currently incorporating this strategy is Xank [41].
Payments on the Xank network have the option of being stabilized by the algo-
rithmic central bank; the bank subtracts Xank tokens when the price of Xank
increases and adds them when it declines so the dollar value stays constant. The
central bank continues to make these adjustments until the tokens are used in
another transaction or the user cashes out of their Xank position. Although such
a currency can serve as a medium of exchange and, to some extent, a store of
value, it cannot serve as a unit of account because the value of individual tokens
is allowed to fluctuate. The largest problem with this design is that the central
bank is essentially providing a free put option, and providing a valuable service
for free is a difficult business model to sustain. Crypto markets tend to have
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fairly long run ups and declines, so there is a high degree of serial correlation in
returns. If users expect prices to increase, they should unpeg their transactions.
If users expect prices to decrease, they will keep their payments stabilized. In
a prolonged downturn, this can lead to the central bank running out of money
and being unable to continue to stabilize payments.
7.2 Peg to Other Assets
Another area for stablecoin expansion is assets pegged to financial assets other
than currencies, such as real estate or stock or bond indices. This would make
it easier for people to diversify their holdings across digital currencies and real
assets without the inconvenience of cashing out of crypto in order to do so. The
traditional finance sector is slowly becoming more interested in crypto markets.
Bitcoin futures have been listed on the Chicago Mercantile exchange since the
end of 2017. Also, NASDAQ lists several blockchain companies and is exploring
uses for blockchain technology, indicating an openness to an integration between
the traditional financial sector and crypto. Although there are several regulatory
hurdles in the way, it is possible that a broader range of financial assets might
eventually be available on crypto markets.
8 Conclusion
Stablecoins, that is, low-volatility, programmable, and auditable currencies, promise
to bridge the chasm between fiat currencies and digital currencies. Their impor-
tance in on-ramping the trillions of assets into digital form is evident in the
sheer number of stablecoins issued over the last few years. In this paper, we
provided a systematic overview of all the different types of stablecoins devel-
oped, and divided the various proposals into constituent design elements, based
on peg, collateral type and amount, stability mechanism, and price informa-
tion. Although there are hundreds of projects in existence, most are variations
of the same few components. There is still much potential for growth in this
area. Although there are many promising designs, none are without their flaws.
Further innovation will be necessary before cryptocurrencies adequately fulfill
the functions of money well enough to be adopted by mainstream users.
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9 Appendix A: Illustration of Stablecoin Mechanisms
$100User Reserve
User	Balance:	$100,	0	USDC
100	USDCUser Reserve
User	Balance:	$0,	100	USDC
Fig.A1. Reserve of Pegged Asset (ex. USDC)
UserMarketMaker Exchange
Market	Maker	Bid:	100
Market	Maker	Ask:	101
Exchange	Bid:	102
Exchange	Ask:	103SGA
Δ
SGA
Δ
UserMarketMaker Exchange
Market	Maker	Bid:	100
Market	Maker	Ask:	101
Exchange	Bid:	100
Exchange	Ask:	101
Fig.A2. Algorithmic (ex. Saga)
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50	BASISUser
User	Balance:	500	BASIS
Contract
PRICE	CHANGE	OF	BASIS	:	$1	to	$0.90
80	BASIS	BONDSUser Contract
PRICE	CHANGE	OF	BASIS	:	$0.90	to	$1
PRICE	CHANGE	OF	BASIS	:	$1	to	$1.1
80	BASIS	BONDSUser Contract
80	BASISUser Contract
PRICE	CHANGE	OF	BASIS	:	$1.1	to	$1
User	Balance:	450	BASIS,	80	BASIS	BONDS
User	Balance:	450	BASIS,	80	BASIS	BONDS
User	Balance:	530	BASIS
Fig.A3. Dual Coin (ex. Basis)
100	ETHUser CDP
User	Balance:	100	ETH	($150	/	1	ETH)
CDP	Balance:	0
CDP6750	DAIUser
User
CDP6750	DAIUser
CDP100	ETHUser
Exchange
DAI
ETH
PRICE	CHANGE	OF	ETH	:	$150	to	$165
User	Balance:	6750	DAI
CDP	Balance:	100	ETH	($150	/	1	ETH)
User	Balance:	4.1	ETH	($165	/	1	ETH)
CDP	Balance:	100	ETH
User	Balance:	104.1	ETH	($165	/	1	ETH)
CDP	Balance:	0
INITIAL	PRICE	OF	ETH	:	$150
User	Balance:	45	ETH
CDP	Balance:	100	ETH	($150	/	1	ETH)
User Exchange
DAI
ETH
User	Balance:	4.1	ETH,	6750	DAI
CDP	Balance:	100	ETH	($150	/	1	ETH)
Fig.A4. Leveraged Loans (ex. Dai)
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Appendix B: Classification of Existing Stablecoins
Name Peg Collateral Collateral
Amount
Price & Supply Adjustments Price Informa-
tion
Carbon USD USD Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
Tether [66] USD USD/Euro Partial Reserve of pegged asset Trades
TrueUSD [69] USD USD Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
Basis USD None None Two coin Oracle
BitUSD [12] USD BTS Full or over leveraged loans Elected delegates
input exchange
prices
Saga [60] initially
SDR,
later CPI
or none
Basket of Fiat
(SDR)
Full to partial Algorithmic market maker Based on amount of
reserve
Bancor [35] ETH ETH Over Algorithmic market maker Based on token bal-
ances
Dai [47] USD ETH Over Leveraged loans Median oracle
Gemini Dol-
lar [23]
USD USD Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
USDC [20] USD USD Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
AAA Re-
serve [29]
Avg in-
flation
for G-10
countries
Fiat, fixed in-
come, and loan
investments
Full Determined by by Arc Fiduciary
Ltd
Trades and oracle
DGX [27] Gold Gold Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
EURS [61] Euro Euro Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
StableUSD/
Stably/
USDS [37]
USD USD Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
PAX [19] USD USD Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
White stan-
dard [24]
USD USD Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
SDUSD [3] USD NEO Over Leveraged loans External oracle
elected by SDS
holders
JPM Coin [38] USD USD Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
USDX [55] USD Lighthouse (LHT) 200%+ Dual coin variant Median of exchange
prices, validated by
users
Stronghold
USD [64]
USD USD Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
sUSD [14] USD Synthetix (SNX) 5x Leveraged loans External oracle
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eUSD
(Havven) [15]
USD ETH Over Leveraged loans External oracle
eUSD by
Epay [28]
USD USD Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
NuBits [45] USD None None Nushareholders vote whether to
list more NuBits on an exchange,
or offer interest to take NuBits out
of circulation
Voting
Token [68] USD USD Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
Monerium [70] One for
each
major
currency
Same as peg Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
Reserve [13] initially
USD
initially USD, later
other assets
Initially full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
Terra [40] SDR None None Dual coin Randomly sample
users who vote on
price
Ampleforth [42] USD None None Supply is expanded or contracted
proportional to market cap
Whitelist of trusted
oracles
Augmint [6] Euro ETH 2x Leveraged loans Exchanges
Bridgecoin [25] USD ETH 2x Leveraged loans +algorithmic
market maker
Oracle
HelloGold [31] Gold Gold Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
Kowala [4] USD None None Block rewards increase when price
is high and are burned when price
is low
Large holders of
mUSD(staking to-
ken) act as oracles
x8c [73] None Gold, USD, Euro,
GBP, JPY, AUD,
CAD, NZD,CHF
Full AI shifts funds across currencies to
keep value constant
External oracle
NOS [51] USD USD Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
Phi [30] USD TBD Over Phi is minted when validators is-
sue a loan and burned when the
loan is paid back
TBD
Celo [39] USD Celo Gold, BTC,
ETH
Variable Dual coin + algorithmic central
bank
Crowd oracle
Aurora Bo-
real [43]
USD ETH and other re-
serves
Partial Supply expands when Decentral-
ized Capital issues loans denom-
inated in Boreal and contracts
when loans are repaid, users will
also receive grants to act as mar-
ket makers
Unknown
Stableunit [44] USD Cryptoassets Initially over Algorithmic market maker Median oracle
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Rockz [59] CHF CHF Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
Steem Dol-
lars [63]
USD None None Interest accrues to Steem Dollar
holders
Steem Power hold-
ers elect oracles
USDVault [71] USD Gold Full Reserve of pegged asset, ”sophis-
ticated gold hedging process” to
maintain peg
Trades
Globcoin.io [33] Gold and
currency
basket
Gold and 15 largest
currencies
Full Reserve of pegged assets, can cash
out to any one currency in basket
Oracle
JCash [8] USD,
KRW
and other
assets
USD, KRW and
other assets
Full Reserve of Pegged asset Trades
Staticoin [62] USD Eth Full Dual coin variant 24h exchange price
Unum [67] USD Cryptoassets Under to over
depending on
prices
Algorithmic market maker: users
sell crypto or Unum to smart con-
tract
External oracle
Poly [32] None Tokenized com-
modities
Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
BitBay [10] None None None Freeze and unfreeze tokens based
on transaction and staking his-
tory. Users receive interest on
frozen coins
Dynamic Peg oracle
BitCNY [12] Chinese
Yuan
BTS Full or over leveraged loans Elected delegates
input exchange
prices
EOSDT [26] USD EOS Over Leveraged loans Oracle
Neutral [52] USD Other stablecoins
(PAX, TUSD, DAI,
and USDC)
Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
Candy [11] Mongolian
Tugrik
Mongolian Tugrik Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
Onegram [53] Gold Gold Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
Carats.io [17] Diamonds Diamonds Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades
Libra [46] Collateral
basket
Bank deposits and
short-term govern-
ment securities
Full Reserve of pegged asset Trades and oracle
Anchor [5] Monetary
measure-
ment
unit
None None Dual coin Oracle
